Self-Respect
Self-Respect is one of those goods to which debaters tend to appeal, but frequently fail to explain. It’s relatively easy to claim that anything from a demeaning job to being subject to anti-religious rhetoric is likely to diminish one’s self-respect. What’s harder is explaining the significance of self-respect. This post will draw upon the work of John Rawls and Jonathan Wolff to explain the value of self-respect, what self-respect requires, the relationship between the level of respect that a person experiences socially and the respect that one has for oneself, and some ways in which one’s self-respect can suffer. If you’re interested, references are at the bottom. Quick note about terminology. For the sake of expediency, I’ve used a bit of philosophical terminology in this post. If you’re going to try and use these arguments in a debate, try to steer away from using the labels as they’re likely to make your argument seem more difficult to follow and abstracted away from the debate.
Self-Respect
Self-respect is an essential precondition for individual flourishing. Rawls argues that, self-respect has two parts;
1.A person’s sense of their own value. A sense that their own lives are worthwhile and that the projects they’re pursuing are worth carrying out. A person that does not value their own life is unlikely to meaningfully buy into any of the things they pursue and are unlikely to lead a life as good as they might have as a result. We won’t enjoy the things that we do.
2.Confidence in one’s ability to fulfil one’s intentions. If you lack confidence you’re either unlikely to try and give voice to your intentions at all, or you’re likely to be plagued by self-doubt when you do. Either way, your capacity to live a meaningful life is undermined.
A lack of either of these is likely to lead to us having a less fulfilling life than we might otherwise have had. That’s an obvious harm. If we’re concerned at all with the quality of life that individuals lead (either on individualist grounds, or on equalitarian grounds), we obviously need to be concerned with self-respect.
Therefore, a typical (and, I think, quite plausible) egalitarian argument for the promotion of self-respect might run as follows.
1.It is of objectively equal importance that all lives flourish.
2.Each person is therefore entitled to an equal share in the resources needed to lead a flourishing life. They should have access to these resources regardless of the morally arbitrary (race, religion, colour, age etc…).
3.To lead a flourishing life, it is essential that a person has access to the bases of self-respect.
1.Explain the reasons why self-respect matters.
4.Therefore the state should guarantee that every person has equal access to the bases of self-respect.
However, in almost every debate, it would never be enough to stop here. Rather, you would need to go on and show why the particular policy you’re either defending or critiquing does or does not promote self-respect.
Before we briefly consider some suggestions to this end from Rawls and Wolff, crucial to establish is the relationship between the respect that others have for an individual, and the self-respect that that individual is likely to have for themselves. The way that we feel about ourselves will be significantly coloured by the extent to which we feel as though we are respected as a moral equal by the rest of society. If we don’t feel as though others value us it seems intuitively right that we’d start to question why that is. It’s likely that we’ll locate some failing in ourselves as the answer. The result must necessarily be a loss of self-respect, as we’ll feel as though we are lacking in value, and possibly as though we lack the capacity to carry through our intentions.
Rawls
Rawls argues that in order to have a sense of our own value (i.e. the first part of self-respect), we need two things.
Firstly, a rational plan of life that satisfies the Aristotelian principle. The Aristotelian principle (in a nutshell) is that human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities. The greater the level of realisation, or the greater the complexity of the task, the more the enjoyment rises.
When activities fail to satisfy the Aristotelian principle we’re not likely to perceive them to be worth doing. If we’ve not been given the choice but to accept activities that aren’t meaningful, we’re likely to begin to feel that we ourselves aren’t meaningful either.
Secondly, recognition from others that our person and projects are appreciated and affirmed by others.
The extent to which others recognise and appreciate what we do is likely to be a function of the extent to which they recognise our activities as valuable/pleasurable/worthy of respect.
Wolff
Wolff’s general thesis is that the egalitarian ‘ethos’ is grounded in the values of fairness and respect. These two goods can come into conflict, and egalitarians may be forced to accept the possibility of a world where neither value is fully implemented. More relevantly for our purposes, however, is Wolff’s analysis of respect. Wolff outlines three ways in which we can lose self-respect.
Failures of common courtesy. A person is not respected if they are denied the usual social graces.
Shameful revelation. Instances where people are forced to act in ways that will reduce the level of respect that others have for them.
Failures of trust. To maintain self-respect, it is important that we feel as though we aren’t acting randomly, but rather in a reasoned fashion. However, it is insulting to be called upon frequently to justify one’s actions. It seems to suggest that one has something to hide, or is seeking an unjustifiable advantage. This expresses a lack of trust in that person which, in turn suggests that that person is not respected.
Where we’re likely, therefore, to fail in common courtesy, to make it appear as though a person is not trusted (at least up to a reasonable threshold), or where we force people into shameful revelation, we lower the extent to which that person is respected. That’s then likely to reduce that person’s self-respect (see above).
Two final things to remember. Firstly, these are all just general ways of characterising specific actions, and that multiple failings of respect can occur in the same iteration. For instance, a person who is forced to work in a minimum wage job that’s not valued by the rest of society is likely to feel as though their work does not at all exercise their realised capacities, is likely to feel as though others do not regard their activities or person as worthwhile, may be likely to experiences failures of common courtesy and may feel as though the fact that they’re in that particular job is itself shamefully revealing their lack of capacity to work in a more meaningful job. Looking at the same action in different ways can often be a really useful way to provide a greater depth of analysis. Secondly, a wide variety of debating topics raise issues of respect (media, social policy, welfare, law, tax, refugees etc…). This analysis is therefore very generally applicable and can be related to lots of debates.
Cheers!
Lachlan
References
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap 1971). The Aristotelian Principle is discussed on page 426, and self-respect is discussed between pages 440 and 446.
Jonathan Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos’ (1998), 27 (2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 97.